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This study asks: in the general absence of a functioning and effective civil administration in Juba’s 
huge suburbs, how have people negotiated personal disputes and neighbourhood management since 
conflict began in 2013? Who arbitrates in Juba, and on what terms? This study challenges top-down 
analyses that see political-military elites managing their ethnic enclaves of followers and fighters 
through nepotism and gifts. Such patronage requires the complex negotiation of responsibilities and 
rights, including over community safety and order. In Juba, the local authorities who mediate this 
have been built by men and women with extensive expertise and connections in South Sudan’s long 
history of ‘civil-military’ governance systems. These local authorities have established lasting 
institutions by negotiating rights to residence in, arbitrating over, and knowing the human geography 
of their neighbourhoods. Their authority is rooted in this deep politics, drawing on their detailed 
knowledge of topographies of power in these multi-ethnic, highly military neighbourhood spaces.  
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INTRODUCTION 
South Sudan fits a dominant narrative: of state predation, fragmentation, and collapse; and of 
the resilience of its people, whose ability to suffer predation and to survive is relied on by 
both the old Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) elites, as they asset strip 
the nation, and by the humanitarian community, who praise their endurance. The civil war 
that broke out in 2013 has repeatedly centred on the capital city of Juba, where clashes 
between President Salva Kiir and then ex-Vice-President Riek Machar’s forces in December 
2013 saw at least 300 people dead in mass violence across the city's suburbs. The power-
sharing deal between Machar and Kiir, which brought Machar and a small number of his 
SPLM/A-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) forces back to the city, broke down in renewed clashes 
in the town in July 2016.1 Since the forced removal of the ex-Chief of General Staff Paul 
Malong Awan from the city in November 2017, Juba is now a fortified military stronghold of 
President Salva Kiir’s governing faction. 
Economic collapse since mid-2012 and then civil war since December 2013 have worked to 
strip back the fragile institutional, legal, and procedural state cladding laid out in the 
internationally-funded building project during peace between 2005 and 2013. The 
accelerating economic breakdown has fundamentally undermined the personalised financial 
systems that kept armed soldiers paid and maintained local markets and rents in Juba’s 
suburbs, and has escalated terrifying rates of violent crime. Army uniforms and guns are for 
hire.2 Juba’s residents are suffering from exhaustion, fear, and the inability to find restitution 
for the vast majority of crimes. During research in late 2015, a church group conducted group 
prayers for safety and justice at the site of a horrific gang rape, and an old woman in another 
suburb explained how she now carries a foot-long crucifix as personal spiritual protection 
since the massacres in December 2013 (E. V., 2015 int.). Where national news reports blame 
violent crime on ‘unknown gunmen’, Juba residents wryly refer to ‘known gunmen,’ or 
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‘unknown government.’ 
If, as Mahmood Mamdani (2016) recently argued, there is now ‘no bureaucracy, no judiciary, 
nothing to fail’, how is Juba governing itself in the everyday as formal structures collapse? 
As several residents noted in 2015 and 2016 (ints.), the current situation in the city is not a 
new normal, but ‘back to normal.’ Most people have experienced living under fragmented, 
personalised forms of local authority tied to the SPLA, the Sudan Armed Forces, and other 
militias in the two previous civil wars, including in Juba, a longstanding garrison town. This 
article strives to understand this renewed normality, and which authorities have roots and 
traction in the city today. What orders are actually resilient, what makes up the remaining 
rules of law, and who rules Juba? 
This study builds on recent work on land rights, legal pluralism, and public authority 
(Tapscott 2017; Justin & De Vries 2017; Hoffmann, Vlassenroot & Marchais 2016; Schouten 
2016; Lund 2016; Twijnstra & Titeca 2016; Pendle 2015; Meagher, De Herdt & Titeca 2014; 
Schomerus & De Vries 2014). It looks at how Juba is regulated and managed by bodies and 
individuals who have been established, and rooted themselves, as arbitrators and 
administrators in the city; and whose careers, investments, and connections span state and 
local government, military and security positions, and private entrepreneurship (drawing on 
Badiey 2013, 2014; McMichael 2014, 2016). It takes up where studies of pluralism and 
hybridity have reached in dissolving boundaries between civil and military, state and non-
state, and customary and statutory laws and rule of law (following Jackson 2017: 256, 264). 
For locals, these authorities – who determine rights to residence, disputes over land and 
marriage, domestic violence cases, abuses by soldiers, disputes over water point access, and 
organise polio vaccinations, tax markets, and manage rubbish dump sites – are only really 
plural in the sense that there are a lot of them across Juba’s roughly forty square miles; their 
multiple connections and interests across institutional, private business, and military-security 
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sectors are entirely normal and congruent in this context. 
This study thus sets Juba’s ‘state’ actors into a wider field of ‘plural, hybrid, public 
authorities’ in the city. It follows Lund (2016, 2006) and Boone (2018, 2014) in explicitly 
linking land, politics, and authority, and specifically takes up the historical and geographical 
turn in research on public authority in the last few years. The majority of Juba’s judicial-
administrative public authorities have grown from negotiations over residential space in 
Juba’s rapidly-expanded suburbs during post-war reconstruction from around 2006 onwards. 
As the (late, disputed) Bari Paramount Chief Dennis Faragalla (2016 int.) noted, ‘the genesis 
of all of these problems is the issue of control of land.’ Badiey’s (2014) study of Juba 
between 2006 and independence in 2011 detailed the personalised tensions and competitions 
between various local ethno-political powers, former Sudanese state government workers, 
arriving SPLA soldiers, and members of the new regional Government of South Sudan and 
the SPLM over reconstructing, and expanding, the booming capital. This article builds on 
Badiey’s work on elite and governmental contestations over the growth of Juba in this period, 
examining the local neighbourhood authorities that have emerged in Juba since the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 as part of this urban sprawl. It argues that these 
neighbourhood authorities are reflective of the military-political agents and organisations that 
negotiated rights to residence in Juba’s huge suburban growth in this interim period.  
In Juba’s rapidly evolving landscape, individuals and local committees have constituted and 
established their authority by mapping out, arbitrating over, and knowing the detailed human 
geography of their neighbourhoods. The roots of their authority are derived from a 
combination of their recent historical knowledge of, and their concomitant ability to arbitrate 
and control, these neighbourhood spaces; and this expertise is grounded in these actors’ 
careers within South Sudan’s long but localised history of ‘civil-military’ governance 
systems that developed within the previous civil wars, particularly over the 1980s to 2000s. 
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These neighbourhood histories demonstrate that these governance systems have always been 
personalised and entrepreneurial, focused on the control and management of people (and their 
frustrations, labour, and wealth). It demonstrates Jackson’s point (2017: 264) that  
 
for most people, justice is not dispensed from formal, modern systems but from a dense network of 
institutions at local level which may or may not be codified or even visible. These institutions 
constantly change and are subject to a variety of controlling bodies which regulate the meaning and 
enforcement of common law. 
 
This historical geography of local authority illustrates how these institutions have negotiated 
their powers and abilities to arbitrate spaces and communities, the groundings of their logics 
and codes, and their sources of legitimacy. 
Exploring the history of these local powers, logics, and legitimacies – how, on a small scale, 
these institutions have established themselves, and have been established, as authorities 
within a community – develops, and challenges, a current dominant political analysis of the 
nature of power in South Sudan today. This analysis sees South Sudan’s elites as competitors 
in a ‘political marketplace’, building their power on systems of patronage and nepotism 
rooted in systemic acquisition of resources (de Waal 2014). These elites, in this analysis, 
selectively invest these resources in gift-giving, marriage and kinship networks (Pinaud 2014: 
192), making themselves a ‘military aristocracy’ (Pinaud 2014, 2016) governing, as 
Stringham and Forney put it (2017: 178), ‘hordes of “tribal” clients, loyal proxies for whom 
‘“tribalism” masks class privilege’, binding this ‘lower stratum of followers’ (Pinaud 2014: 
195) to them through bridewealth, gifts, and other forms of corruption. In this analysis, the 
civil war erupted when these elites finally failed to balance the financial and political 
demands of their hundreds of SPLA commanders and ethnically-based factional battalions, 
and a greater smorgasbord of other antagonistic parochial militias (de Waal 2014; Mamdani 
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2016). As such, South Sudan’s current political leadership is now commonly depicted as a 
military mafioso with a whole country to prey on (D’Agoôt & Miamingi 2016; de Waal 
2016), only nominally running a ‘non-existent state’ (Mamdani 2016).  
This study argues that this powerful neo-patrimonial perspective is elite-driven and reductive 
(following Mkandawire 2015; Wai 2012). To over-focus on elite predation can implicitly 
sketch out a clientelist ‘base’ with very little agency or critical capacity, engaged only in 
drawing down trickles of goods and services from their masters (Anciano 2017; Palomera & 
Vetta 2016). This approach also ignores the deep politics of this power. It overlooks the 
locally powerful men and women who actually organise militias and mobilisation, their 
motives and choices (Stringham & Forney 2017: 178, 181–2); and it does not explain how 
and on what terms people engage, consent, ignore or challenge these elites’ power plays and 
exploitations.  
Juba’s political geography illustrates this deep politics. The military-political elite 
competition to control the distribution of land and ensuing rents in the new suburbs of Juba 
since 2006 is a demonstration of how over the last thirty years South Sudanese people have 
seen ‘the expansion and penetration of the predatory government economy’ into rural refuges 
and societal economic and social structures (Leonardi 2011: 232). But – crucially – once 
these new suburbs are established, these same militarised authorities continue to be involved 
in the management of these neighbourhoods within which their garrisons, government 
offices, businesses, and families are often located, using more than just the threat or use of 
force, or demands of base rents and reciprocities. This involves, as Stringham and Forney 
(2017: 179) argue, ‘relationships that hold communities together in the crucible of conflict’, 
particularly in the multi-ethnic, heterogeneous suburbs of Juba. How Juba’s militarised, elite-
connected neighbourhood authorities manage their communities, and what they manage, 
demonstrates some of the deep politics of responsibility and reciprocity on which such 
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militarised authority and patronage rests. Following Lund’s work, this article suggests that 
looking at how communities and local authorities have been built around mobile and diverse 
families and residents is a way to explore this geography of power in the city, and its 
‘resilient’ civic cultures (Lund & Boone 2013). 
To do this, this article first sets out an overview of what systems have collapsed, and what 
has remained, in Juba since the outbreak of war in 2013. It then turns to the evolution of 
Juba: how the city’s huge growth since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 
has been shaped by, and evolved, neighbourhood authorities across the city; and who and 
what actually constitutes this authority, what these authorities do, and on what terms.  
 
JUBA: A LEGAL GEOGRAPHY 
Over 2005 to 2013, under the regional and then independent governments of South Sudan, 
significant energy and money was invested in constructing a ‘new normal’ for an ostensibly 
‘new nation’ (or at very least a ‘new state’). New laws drafted after the end of the second 
civil war, under the interim regional administration, set out a hierarchy of legal and statutory 
authority from the high court to ‘customary’ chiefs’ courts at county and sub-county levels 
that echoed a prospective administrative system for service delivery (Leonardi et al. 2010). 
Juba was at the heart of this state–, government–, and law–building project, hosting the high 
court and court of appeal, national and Central Equatoria State ministries, police training 
centres, and local government offices. Despite extensive under-staffing and under-skilling, 
these offices contained individuals with significant expertise and personal commitment to 
making things work, based often on personal administrative and legal experience from 
previous Sudan government work, and/or employment within local civil-military 
administrations of the SPLM/A. In practice, these ‘new’ institutions only somewhat reworked 
old expertise, laws, practice and paperwork. The most significant aspects of this institution-
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building process were mostly focused in Juba, mainly the salaries and training opportunities. 
But these state systems’ reach was extremely limited, even within Juba, and under significant 
stress even before the economic crisis and political collapse over 2013 (see Badiey 2014). 
The violence in the city in December 2013 stripped away the finances, salaries, and the 
apparently distinct roles of security, police, military and legal system workers, and escalated 
abuses of power and contempt for these laws, particularly among military-security actors, 
whose powers, staff and areas of control have proliferated and competed against each other in 
the city since 2014 (Amnesty International 2016). By the end of 2017, many civic state and 
county-level offices were either shut or vacant, and judges sacked or intimidated into 
resigning (Ibreck, Logan & Pendle 2017; Reuters 7.9.2017). 
The collapse of this formal legislative and judicial edifice was in part the impetus for the 
research that underpins this article. The interviews and meetings across Juba that have 
contributed to this study were conducted as part of research for the British Council in support 
of an ‘access to justice’ project, funded by the European Union, focused on justice systems in 
Juba over early 2015 to July 2016. Access to justice programming in South Sudan has 
followed the same trajectory as the general state-building project over this period: grand 
designs for the formalisation, structuring and empowerment of a state-run system have been 
foundered by the continued militarism, under-funding, and politicisation of legal, policing 
and judicial systems, particularly since early 2013 (Copeland 2015). Most international 
projects focused on supporting statutory legal systems have failed, in part because they have 
very little left to work with that they recognise. The research used here was commissioned 
specifically to look at what systems of rule of law and justice actually were working in Juba 
by 2015, and their work, logics, and roots. Research involved open discussions and 
interviews with a cross-section of society in three suburban areas, with market women and 
manual labourers as well as with chiefs, headmen, local state and volunteer police, and 
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soldiers.  
These residents and local justice system workers put forward an alternative geography of 
political and legal order in Juba, beyond any distinctions between state and society (as per 
Denney 2014). They referred to more long-standing neighbourhood structures, authorities, 
norms and logics of controlling the capital that are relatively established and understood by 
their residents. These neighbourhood authorities make up a patchwork across Juba: they are 
now the men (and some women) and small local institutions that task themselves with 
managing neighbourhood law and order, including regulating services, security forces’ 
activities and abuses, and managing settlement –– all insofar as possible. These people and 
organisations are not elites, but have vertical ties and extensive localised connections, and 
find their legitimacy, ability to act, consent to arbitration through their connections and 
abilities to provide some protections or determinations that stand against military or security 
abuses. These authorities and neighbourhood structures are fundamentally tied to how their 
area became a suburb of the city, particularly in the huge new residential areas outside of 
Juba’s small old town. 
 
The geography of authority in Juba 
Over 2006 to 2011, Juba was likely the fastest-growing city in the world. As internally 
displaced families, refugees, jobseekers and workers in massive new state-building and 
developmental projects flowed into the city, the town grew from around 250,000 to an 
estimated million residents by 2011.3 Formal processes for land allocation were overtaken by 
local Bari chiefs and other political elites’ own distributions of plots. Various people and 
organisations negotiated the delineation of scrub areas as new neighbourhoods, often 
involving legally creative collaborations between city officials, SPLM/A officials, Bari 
community organisations, local village authorities on Juba’s rural outskirts, and refugee and 
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returnee spokespeople (see Badiey 2014: 14, 115, 135). Mostly, people settled around family 
or kin, or in groups reflecting communities and villages where they had come from, such as 
neighbourhoods from Khartoum's South Sudanese-dominant suburbs (UNHCR News 
11.12.2012; Pantuliano 2009). In this period, Juba became a city of villages. These 
neighbourhoods (‘hai’) – although barely delineated from each other, usually by main roads 
and creeks, and densely populated – remained insular. Within neighbourhoods or residential 
blocks, people from different ethnic and social backgrounds, for example returning refugees 
from Uganda or from Khartoum, still have a real lack of knowledge of other residential areas, 
and commonly express mutual suspicions and ethno-regional stereotyping. These fears took 
extreme form during Juba’s most rapid period of expansion in 2008 to 2010, with several 
panics over suspected poisoning of water points in Jebel Kujur and Kator by returning 
refugees from Uganda and Congo, believed to have picked up witchcraft skills in exile and to 
be using them against their neighbours (Schomerus et al. 2008: 35–36). 
In this immediate context, it is not surprising that existing studies of Juba primarily focus on 
land rights and conflicts, and on the role of disputed land rights and ownership in shaping 
South Sudan’s new state. For some pre-CPA residents from local Bari ethnic communities, 
this was an invasion (McMichael 2014: 392; Badiey 2013: 64). Most commentary on Juba’s 
rapid expansion over the 2005 to 2011 peace period has focused on this Bari contestation 
with the state over land rights and restitution (Pantuliano et al. 2011; Justin & van Leeuwen 
2016: 437; Hirblinger 2015: 709; Badiey 2013; McMichael 2014). This contestation, and 
informal land demarcation, continues today. Bari protests over Juba’s ‘occupation’ have been 
renewed with President Salva Kiir’s sub-division of South Sudan’s ten states into twenty-
eight, creating a Jubek State which local hardliners hope will become a Bari ethnic fiefdom, 
distinct from the neighbouring Mundari. The late Bari paramount chief Dennis Daramallo 
Kundi (2016 int.) emphasised that ‘everyone [else] within this area is a squatter.’4 
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The expropriation, demarcation, and allocation of land around Juba for profit and power by 
political and military elites has been rightly criticised – not least by Juba's residents – as a 
process of greed and exploitation (McMichael 2014: 339). McMichael (2016: 2721) 
emphasises  
 
the exploitative terms on which powerful figures such as informal settlement leaders, public officials, 
military actors and local chiefs intervened in informal land transactions at the expense of poorer 
informal settlement inhabitants... Creat[ing] opportunities for a range of actors to exploit vulnerable 
inhabitants.  
 
But this was, and is, not a one-way process of predation: these elites were involved in 
shaping and managing suburban communities not only for gross self-aggrandisement but also 
because they often lived within these areas, or had family and kin involved and invested 
within these new neighbourhoods. For many military commanders and other powerful 
figures, managing the inevitable growth of suburbs containing significant numbers of military 
families was and is a vital and civic necessity for maintaining public order and authority. 
These new residents brought with them authorities of varying provenances and legitimacies, 
including rural chiefs from old lineages across South Sudan or chiefs appointed by the SPLA 
during the civil wars, authorities appointed in refugee camps and displaced settlements in 
northern Sudan, Darfur and across eastern Africa, and newly-minted arbitrators and 
businesspeople taking up positions in Juba’s neighbourhood committees and urban ethnic 
associations. Urbanisation, like wartime displacement, has split families and clans between 
rural and urban areas and across borders, multiplying chiefs and other ethnic representatives 
in networks across the country. Many of these alternative local authorities engaged 
themselves in organising the extra-state demarcation of new Juba suburbs, drawing on 
military and political connections from the civil war years: their local authority to arbitrate 
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and administrate these neighbourhoods stems as much from their dispensation of rights to 
residence in their area as it is from their personal powers and connections. Their knowledge 
and authority is recognised essentially through their lack of recognition by state authorities in 
Juba, as explained by a Dinka chief in one new suburb (Shirikat, 2015 int.): 
 
In the crisis [of 2013], people just came, expanding the area. After this, the land policy in the 
government constitution says it belongs to the community. So Rejaf [Bari] community disputes this, 
as land grabbing, so when a case appears in Kator [state court], [the Bari-led court declares that] the 
case should be transferred back to the area, because it cannot be settled in the court – [because] there 
are no papers [of residence]. So when a problem is from the residential area [here], and it is disputed 
in Kator, that court transfers it [back] here. It says ‘we don’t know those areas’ – it’s not considered 
as legal. 
 
These neighbourhoods are thus partly outside of the town’s state structure, knowledge, and 
civic/civil authority.5 This day-to-day authority instead rests with the people who have 
organised and arbitrated these new neighbourhoods; and so the recent history of how these 
various local elites managed this rapid expansion – their knowledge of the varied legal and 
social topography of Juba's suburbs, including its garrisons and multiple avenues for 
petitioning for funds and services – is at the root of their authority and their continued 
abilities to arbitrate and manage these spaces. Legitimate authority is defined in this context 
as whoever has the proven knowledge, connections, and relationships that are necessary to 
mediate disputes between neighbours, whose claims to legitimate residence are based on both 
this recent history of neighbourhood creation, and the various common law determinants of 






Gurrei and Gumbo 
This study focuses on two examples of these authorities and constituencies: the collective 
greater area to the west of the central city, known as Gudele, and in particular one of its 
neighbourhoods called Hai Jebel Dinka (Dinka Hill); and the area known as Hai Gumbo or 
Hai Gumbo Shirikat (Companies) across the Nile. Gudele constitutes a sprawl of suburban 
neighbourhoods spreading out along the roads to Mundri and Yei to the north and southwest 
respectively. Military outposts and landmines had forced villages out of the area by the mid-
1980s (Badiey 2013: 71–73). After 2005, the large numbers of returning displaced residents 
from Khartoum’s slums and camps gave Gudele the nickname ‘New Khartoum’ (Khartoum 
Gedid) by 2008. Gudele’s land was taken up and re-demarcated by various powerful 
individuals and collectives (Pantuliano 2009: 160). One suburb, arranged around a small 
market, and delimited by some old paths which are now roads, was demarcated by a coalition 
of Bari elders and SPLA insiders; land disputes and sales have been managed by the resident 
Bari chief since 2006, with reference to a ledger on land allocations for the village’s 
ethnically diverse community (Souk Zande ints., 2011 and 2015).  
A more controversial neighbourhood sits nearby. Based on an old pre-war cattle market site, 
the village of Jebel Dinka is made up of primarily Dinka, Nuer and Mundari military families 
and ex-Khartoum residents, many of whom were displaced from squatted areas in central 
Juba, including Hai Goniya, Tong Ping and Hilla Kuku, by the Central Equatorian state over 
2007 to 2008. Government officials and army generals, whose extended families were some 
of those subject to this relocation drive, organised the allocation of land to a registered list of 
displaced families in 2008, and appointed a Dinka man – not coincidentally, the brother of a 
SPLA general – to oversee the settlement and neighbourhood order, in collaboration with 
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Nuer, Chollo and Mundari community leaders and chiefs among the new residents (Chief 
Thiep, 2015 int.). This powerful local leadership, made up of sixteen chiefs of various 
provenances who are given authority by, and frequently draw on, their military connections 
for policing and enforcement, are generally locally respected as ‘zol kabeer’ (big men). One 
Nuer chief on this committee explained that ‘we try to provide services, doing our own 
things. Because we provide the [medical] clinic, we get respect as the only system here.’ 
(Marko, 2015 int.) 
Across the Nile, and like Gudele also outside of Juba’s established municipal boundaries, the 
area broadly known as Gumbo has expanded massively since 2010, due in part to the 
construction of the tarmac Nimule highway running to the Uganda border. Based on the old 
Bari village of Gumba, this area suffered extensively during the civil war and was heavily 
mined. Its expansion was driven by the huge growth in import traffic from Uganda, which 
has lent a name to one suburb – Shirikat, literally ‘Companies’ in Arabic – and encouraged 
the expansion of cheap accommodation and nightclub ‘lodges’ along the main roads. ‘Moral 
cleansing’ campaigns to demolish lodges and evict sex workers in Custom Market in central 
Juba in 2009, 2011 and 2013 also saw many small businesses relocate across the river (Sudan 
Tribune 12.7.2010). Greater Gumbo has a plethora of justice systems, from established Bari 
village court systems displaced to Juba’s suburbs by the 1990s wars, to self-made chiefs’ 
courts in newly-demarcated areas. An area at the far reaches of Gumbo, along the Nimule 
highway, established its own neighbourhood committee and court system in 2013; their 
committees are made up of local Bari, greater Equatorian, Dinka and – before the violence of 
July 2016 – Nuer residents. These local officials are unrecognised by state authorities and the 
local police, but had themselves established a youth centre, a ‘community police’ office and 
rota, and campaigned successfully for an NGO-built water pump (Boniface, 2015 int.). The 
elected Bari chief of the area (2015 int.) explained: 
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We erected a police and youth office, and formed community policing at night to patrol the area. [We] 
had been requesting the police to be brought to his area, but they [said] that they lack the personnel. 
That is why the youth and community are trying their best at least to patrol at night, and that reduces 
the crime at night. 
 
Municipal or state services are broadly absent across these new suburbs, generally present 
only as individual police stations (for instance at Gurrei in Godele) or as one of many 
unpredictable and unaccountable tax collectors in neighbourhood markets. In practice, these 
suburbs’ local authorities derive their legitimacy from doing what local government is 
supposed to do, in funding clinics, convening community meetings, lobbying NGOs to 
provide services such as boreholes, collecting donations for youth and women’s association 
offices, and organising ‘community policing’ patrols. These self-government processes, 
networks and skills were developed during the war, and have been employed in Juba by the 
city’s new, mostly ex-refugee and ex-displaced residents regardless of the peace declaration 
and establishment of a new nation-state.  
These local justice systems, in making service provisions central to their role and legitimacy, 
reflect the common understanding of justice and security in Juba. In the current economic 
collapse, arbitrating access to resources is key to maintaining social order and preventing 
violence and criminality. As Justine, a female Nuer court member in Gumbo said, ‘we are so 
poor we can’t describe it’: for her, the rule of law depended on maintaining order at the water 
pump queue, and arbitrating over a general lack of saucepans and cooking equipment among 
local families displaced from Bor in 2013 and 2014 (Justine, 2015 int.). Successful mediation 
of these basic but crucial issues is the foundation of these authorities’ legitimacy. Their 
knowledge of how to create these comprehensible, workable local systems is bedded in their 
members’ experience of doing the same work during previous times of insecurity, violent 
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governance, and insurrection back into the 1980s and 1990s, and their knowledge of how to 
negotiate with and call on the responsibilities of the men and families who have gained 
military, political and financial power during this period, what this article calls deep politics 
(following Berman 2004: 22). 
 
CIVIL-MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES IN JUBA’S NEIGHBOURHOODS 
This deep politics was built within the city’s political-military neighbourhood histories. Juba 
is an old province capital and garrison post, near Gondokoro, a pre-colonial fortified slave 
trading centre. The small town was essentially under siege from the early 1990s until 2005, 
controlled by a hugely violent and repressive security-military apparatus under the Sudan 
Government, and ringed by a mined perimeter, beyond which individual SPLA units and 
other paramilitary groups controlled checkpoints and roads, took over teak and coffee 
plantations, maintained its own chiefs and military law, and settled in ‘liberated’ areas with 
their families across Equatoria (Branch & Mampilly 2005). These processes of urban-rural 
control, law, and resettlement continued after the CPA in 2005 (Schomerus et al. 2008), 
when many of these units and communities resettled within the de-mined fringes of Juba. 
Badiey (2014) has extensively outlined the immediate tensions between the wartime residents 
and administrators of Juba and the arriving SPLM/A-affiliated families, soldiers and 
political-military elites over 2005–2008. As the SPLM/A institutionalised its state and 
military power over 2006–2011 and established its political and military hold on the new 
regional government apparatus and capital, its personnel and their families also reshaped 
neighbourhoods. 
A survey of this military society is not within the purview of this article, but this ‘lower 
stratum of followers’ (as Pinaud puts it, 2014: 195) made up complex new neighbourhoods. 
In a 2015 social survey of a Juba suburb, one third of respondents considered themselves a 
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present or past member of a militia or military force; likely most of the male population 
surveyed, as 55 per cent of respondents were men (Deng & Willems 2015: 12).6 This is 
understandable, as there has never been a distinct standing national army in South Sudan: the 
SPLA, the government’s police, security, intelligence and prisons services, militias and 
paramilitaries are hybrid and sprawling, with recruitment managed by commanders and unit 
leaders, and many soldiers and officers kept on standby, as reserves to be moved and 
mobilised dependent on the political and financial climate (Pendle 2015: 411; Mamdani 
2016). Conscription and military training led by local SPLA, militia and police personnel has 
been widespread and normalised across Gogrial, Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal areas 
throughout the post-2005 period, and particularly since independence in 2011. Suburban 
residents are thus widely armed, often have combat histories, or are still part of personalised 
forces and units organised under and (infrequently) paid through the patronage of individual 
officers and commanders. Many military families live in neighbourhood blocks and 
compounds organised by these leaders, or around old garrison sites like Gumbo. New 
neighbourhoods such as Mia Saba and New Site in Juba were established, and are claimed 
by, various divisions and factions of the SPLA (ex-combatants and serving soldiers, Mia 
Saba, Shirikat and Jebel Dinka, 2015 ints.). 
This militarised topography is not static. With the escalating elite power struggles over 2013, 
many political elites – particularly those allied to President Kiir – moved both old and new 
units of their particular SPLA battalions and personally-recruited militias into the city. The 
violent confrontation between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar’s military forces in Juba in 
December 2013 again altered the military geography of Juba, as Machar-aligned Nuer 
soldiers and their families – as well as the wider Nuer community and those protecting them 
– were targeted in what appear to have been systematic massacres by groups of pro-Kiir 
SPLA, militia, security and police personnel across the city (Johnson 2014). During the 
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violence, pro-Kiir forces from the Gumbo garrison took over the Gumbo radio station, and 
secured the only bridge across the Nile and the vital Nimule highway; these soldiers have 
been resident at these key installations since, often moving into houses and plots abandoned 
by fleeing Nuer residents (Gumbo residents, 2015 ints.). 
Public authority in Juba’s villages is thus bound up in systems of military labour. This can 
appear ethnically essentialist: Alex de Waal stated recently that ‘Juba... is fast becoming a 
city of ethnic enclaves, each with its own defence forces’ (2016b: 5). But this suburban 
management is more complex, and thus a little less brutally tribalist, than this summary. 
Residents’ organisation of multi-ethnic, military-connected ‘customary’ courts are locally 
reflective, and do not necessarily demonstrate a city of ‘ethnic enclaves’. Instead these courts 
show how the complexity of ethnicity is often underestimated in Juba, particularly in 
conversations around land rights that simplify tensions to the overarching political-regional 
categories of Bari or Dinka (for critiques of this simplification, see Badiey 2014: 9; Leonardi 
2011: 216). Many of Juba’s families are mixed-ethnicity, and live on streets with families 
from a wide range of regional and ethnic backgrounds. The street I lived on over 2012–2013 
in Munuki Block C, for instance, was majority-Equatorian, but housed a Bari-Nuer couple 
and their children, a Dinka family with a Darfuri husband, a brief sub-let to a Chollo woman 
and her children, and a mixed-ethnicity Lotuho-Kakwa-Tokiman Bari household. Local 
authorities dealing with disputes over rubbish dumps, latrine siting, or domestic violence 
incidents have to reflect this diversity and mobility of their residents, and shift, grow, or 
disband depending on local need. For instance, a Lotuho court in Gumbo, set up for a block 
of houses with Lotuho-only residents, added a Nuer court member in 2012 when several Nuer 
families moved back into the area. The Nuer membership then grew and instituted its own 
sub-court in 2015 to deal with intra-Nuer disputes; both the Nuer and Lotuho courts have 
continued to solve neighbourhood-wide problems, in collaboration with a local (eastern 
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Equatorian) Pari court (court members, Gumbo, 2015 ints). These efforts are not novel to 
local residents; they are continuations of neighbourhood committees run in refugee camps, 
displaced settlements, and peri-urban areas across South Sudan and the region throughout the 
wars. They depend on their heterogeneity and flexibility in order both to mediate intra-ethnic 
disputes with consideration for competing types of legal standards, moral codes, and haq 
(rights, the right ways); and to be able to draw on a wide range of political-military 
connections and authority to manage this militarised social terrain. 
These heterogeneous and ethnically plural neighbourhood committees and courts 
predominantly deal with heavily armed and military-connected family and inter-personal 
disputes, many of which fall across ethnic lines or are within multi-ethnic families. Many 
workers in these local authorities talk about impunity, rather than ethnic tensions, as the main 
problem in their work. Local chiefs, priests and local police inspectors across Juba all 
complained of the difficulty of bringing security, military or other government-affiliated 
suspects to account; barracks administrations often tell civil or police authorities that ‘we 
have taken that man to the front line’, without further accountability (Social worker, 2015 
int). As Peter Justin and Mathijs van Leeuwen (2016: 429) observe in Yei, soldiers frequently 
ignore court summons and claim that they cannot be prosecuted in civil courts. Many families 
who fled during the December 2013 or July 2016 violence, to Uganda or to the UN 
Protection of Civilians camps, have found their houses and land occupied by military or 
militiamen from different factions.  
A good example of the local response to this issue is the Gumbo neighbourhood court 
system. Much like Jebel Dinka’s multi-ethnic ‘chiefly’ committee, with Dinka military 
connections as well as representation from Nuer, Chollo, and Zande families living in the 
area, Gumbo’s many ethnically-compound courts include several regional-specific courts, 
such as for Greater Upper Nile (regional court members, 2015 ints.). These were established 
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from 2006 to 2008 around the old barracks site at the centre of Gumbo’s new urban sprawl. 
The Greater Upper Nile chiefs’ court secretary explained that in 2007, the area was mostly 
occupied by military families alongside Bari villages (Shirikat, 2015 int). These military 
communities were originally governed under SPLA military justice, but as increasing 
numbers of non-military families moved to the area, the military police refused to take on 
civilian-only cases. The court was established to take these on, with the approval of the 
barracks’ military justice system. These courts are still heavily armed, and involve many 
members from military intelligence, the military police, and national security. One Gumbo 
court set up in this way, and led by relatively young military intelligence officer ‘chiefs’, uses 
the SPLA code of conduct in their copy of the SPLA Rules and Regulations 2009 as a key 
reference in their judgements (Peter, military intelligence officer and court member, 2015 
int.): 
 
When a soldier threatens someone using a gun, [I look] into the laws of the army. If it’s a heavy case, 
then [it is] filed at SPLA General Headquarters, according to the article. When it’s a minor case, we 
will solve it locally.  
 
It may be more useful to look at this local governance through the knowledge base of these 
authorities. The people involved in these courts must know not only how their 
neighbourhoods were constituted – the land claims, forms of rights, and different residents in 
their area – but also what interests are at play in these very specific and militarised 
neighbourhoods, ethnically, politically, and personally, and the possibilities and limitations 
these fast-evolving circumstances proscribe. The men and some women who work as 
arbitrators and administrators in these local committees and courts have careers, investments, 
and connections that span state and local government positions, military and security 
positions, and private entrepreneurship. These authorities often draw on their own networks 
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and experience from working within military justice systems in wartime territories occupied 
variously by Sudan government forces, government-allied militias and the SPLA. Many 
people in these courts across Juba have extensive skills and experience of making ‘common 
law’ work around Juba and in refugee camps, within Sudan government-held areas, and 
within the civil-military administrations of the SPLM/A’s liberated territories over the 1990s 
and 2000s; some men and women’s experience of this work stretches back to the 1960s. 
Several men and women noted that their work continues to be essentially civil-military 
administration. 
This experience and expertise underpins many of these courts’ abilities to draw down military 
powers to enforce some (if not all) of their arbitration work. All of the various authorities I 
met in the course of research across Juba had some limited but tested means of circumventing 
certain forms of militarised impunity; some methods of seeking redress and accountability, or 
at least rapprochement, with local military authorities; and some ways of finding funding for 
community services such as boreholes or pharmacies, from state as well as private sources. 
This included friendly or familial connections to agents or offices in the Military Intelligence, 
National Security, and police apparatus, or a person’s own work or career history in these 
agencies, and their relationships with local police, battalions and units stationed in 
commanders’ personal houses in Gudele and Gumbo. Community police, neighbourhood 
watch patrols, vigilante road blocks and other complex forms of mob policing and 
extrajudicial punishment are organised and resourced on Juba’s fringes as part of these 
networks (chiefs’ court members, Jebel Dinka and Gumbo Shirikat, 2015 ints.). Several 
courts have found ways of forcibly bringing suspects from military barracks or their 
commander’s compounds to hearings; one court has enforced a ban on military uniforms in 
court hearings, fining those who appear in uniform (usually in order to intimidate the other 
party) with the support of the area’s military and police offices. In 2015, the Jebel Dinka 
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court resolved a domestic violence and divorce case by granting the divorce to the injured 
wife of a serving police officer, and organising with his commanding office for child support 
payments to be taken from his salary; a family member of the court working in the police 
station is overseeing this. These authorities enforce their decisions through the threat of 
imprisonment or physical punishment from state or community police, but also through 
social pressure and public shaming. Their determinations are not necessarily reflective of 
international or national laws, and made more often on the basis of social stability and 
collective security, rather than fairness; for the courts I spoke to for this study, their priority is 
to minimise risks of issues escalating, including by arbitrating accidental road deaths and 
teenage pregnancies through compensatory processes (2015 ints.). 
Despite increasing numbers of female representatives across Juba, these courts are still 
patriarchal, punitive, and militarised. This is hardly surprising. As Lemay-Hébert and 
Freedman recently noted (2017: 4), hybridity is not parity; hybrid authorities and legal 
pluralism still constructs and continues hegemonies, and enforces silence around certain 
abuses and inequalities (Jackson 2017: 263). But these authorities, mediating between Juba’s 
multiplicity of military-political elites and its residents, are not just greedy authoritarians 
whose power is dependent on base coercion and the dispensation of gifts. These men and 
women have forged careers spanning multiple civil-military regimes in which they are 
involved in the deep politics of making coercion into consent. Patronage and clientelism are 
not only the dispensation of elite favours from above to a grateful but rapacious proletariat, 
but involve the negotiation of deep responsibilities of those with power for their constituency 
– which is not a remote rural family, but often lives within the same compound or 
neighbourhood. Following Jeffrey et al. (2015: 179), this is the fine balancing of power and 
responsibility that underpins claims to legitimate authority.  
This is an open discussion locally. When people get angry about corruption, impunity and 
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elitism in Juba, this is – as Stringham and Forney observe – ‘less about clientelism, and more 
about a lack of ethical reciprocity between political elites and rural communities’ (2017: 
195). The most established local authorities, such as the court in Jebel Dinka, have significant 
support from their village residents because of their track record of looking after people, 
making somewhat fair and enforced decisions in disputes and in aid distributions, and – in 
general – using their powers and patronage for a roughly common good (residents, Jebel 
Dinka, 2015 ints.). 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study suggests an alternative picture of authorities and the rule of law in Juba today. 
Rather than setting out changes versus continuities over 2005 onwards, it emphasises instead 
how individuals, institutions and organisations have assembled and evolved local order, 
logics and practices within adaptable systems that manage chronic instability in fast-
expanding peri-urban neighbourhoods. South Sudanese residents have developed and 
recreated forms of authority, organising, and ways of managing complex spaces and difficult 
circumstances throughout successive periods of insecurity and various violent governments, 
which strive to maintain a level of normalcy and structure in military-dominated 
environments and complex communities, even if this normalcy is patriarchal and frequently 
violent and coercive. These authorities and their methods are based on an evolving common 
knowledge of how organisation can work in South Sudan, of what can be done and sorted 
out, on what terms, with what limitations. Their legal and moral codes and standards are 
drawn from across South Sudan’s heterogeneous cultures, from state legal paperwork and 
practices from Sudan as well as from the SPLM/A wartime administrations, and from other 
sources with significant moral and social weight, such as John Garang’s speeches and the 
SPLA code of conduct. This is what currently makes up law in Juba. 
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The work of these local authorities work sets out a practical understanding of how to govern 
South Sudan: using basic ethno-regional categories to structure court representation (as Nuer, 
Pari, Chollo, or Kakwa, for instance) but also negotiating and understanding complex multi- 
and inter-ethnic familial and social disputes, using ethnic heritages as the structuring moral 
codes and ethical authority to demand social responsibility, respect, and adherence to court 
decisions. This is not just a system of base ‘ethnic’ loyalties and deference to elite military 
patrons, a picture implied by a top-down approach to South Sudan’s ‘political marketplace’, 
but a social and moral balancing act that requires societal and cultural expertise, as well as 
the ability to draw down coercive power. Most people explained that they approached these 
court systems not necessarily hoping for justice – which in most cases, because of the 
difficulty in tracing, arresting and prosecuting suspects for anything from petty theft to rape, 
is often unlikely – but for practicable solutions that would be fair enough in the medium term. 
These local court committees’ legitimacy and authority is built on their ability to manage 
this, and to provide some kind of neighbourhood stability and predictability within which 
families can plan at least an interim future. 
As such, as well as building up a historical and geographical understanding of public 
authority in Juba, this article emphasises the temporality of these authorities. As paramount 
chief Daramallo summarised (2016 int.):  
 
In theory, no tribe can make a court in the area of another tribe. Chiefs have proliferated with 
urbanisation; the legitimate ones are in the village. The urban ones are pseudo-chiefs… Are these 
courts to be temporarily recognised? And how do we cater for these justice matters without changing 
the existing system?  
 
Operating in this questionable space, these Juba authorities are making and protecting space 
and community for a certain value of protection, community, and rights to residence, for a 
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limited but useful time. Their parameters, rules, and organisation are constantly shifting 
across the city’s suburbs, but their authority is in part derived from being able to make 
decisions that stick, not for some entirely unfeasible ‘permanent’ future, but for the time 
being. This temporality makes their decisions possibly more legitimate – because they 
implicitly recognise the instability and possible impermanence of both claims and lives in 
Juba, and unpredictable collective futures. Decisions made (including rights to residence, 
marriage settlements, custody, and other disputes) are settled on the most practicable balance 
of the interests of individuals, families, and safety. These compromises are part of a long 
history of temporary arbitration and authority, particularly for migrant and urban residents, 
who have worked with promissory notes and marriage settlements based on future prospects 
throughout the last civil war. From the perspective of this local history, many of South 
Sudan’s ideas of governance and legal administration have been generated through this 











1. For the wider context of South Sudan’s successive crises and civil wars over 2013 to 2018, see de Vries and 
Schomerus 2017; de Waal 2014, 2016; Kindersley and Rolandsen 2017; Johnson 2014; Center for Civilians in 
Conflict 2016; Amnesty International 2016. 
2. ‘There are some cases [where] some policemen and SPLA soldiers, they hire their guns and uniforms to 
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civilians per night: some will pay SSP 500 [then around $2.50] - others can go for SSP 1000 - and if the mission 
is successful, you add more money to the boss.’ Chief, Godele, 2015 int. 
3. Figures vary widely, and these estimates are the average. See Badiey 2014: 5; McMichael 2016: 2726; Grant 
& Thompson 2013; Martin & Mosel 2011: 3. For a longer history of Juba’s growth, see Chang-Jwok Otor 1981: 
53; Nakao 2013; McMichael 2016: 2726. 
4. These ethnicised land tensions around the capital have been over-simplified as ‘Equatorian-Dinka’ 
contestations; and as contests between wartime SPLM/A fighters and those who lived and worked within Sudan 
Government territory. See Badiey 2013, 2014; Leonardi 2011. 
5. This somewhat undermines the common assertion that Juba residents have significant opportunities for ‘forum 
shopping’ for their justice needs. While some wealthier, more mobile, and better-connected residents can move 
cases between state, ‘customary’, and military courts to suit their strategies, most residents are limited by 
circumstance, finance and social capital to these local committees and neighbourhood courts; and many cases of 
land disputes, divorce, and domestic violence are referred back to these local courts by central authorities (such 
as the statutory court at Godele, and the chiefs sitting at Kator B court) as outside of their practical jurisdiction. 
6. This figure is likely inflated; but since heightened political tensions in July 2013, President Kiir and other 
political and military elites have moved many battalions into Juba and the surrounding area, with reinforcements 
in early 2016. Many of these soldiers and paramilitary forces brought their families to the city. 
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